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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review orders of the 
Industrial Commission pursuant to former Utah Code Jiim. § 35-1-86 
(1994) (repealed effective July 1, 1997) and Utah Code Ann. § 34A-
1-303(6) (1997). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The overall issue is whether the Industrial Commission erred 
in requiring Petitioner Utah Tile and Roofing and CNA Insurance 
Company to pay workers' compensation benefits for an injury 
Respondent Kevin T. Day (the "applicant") suffered while working 
for another employer, Respondent Sheet Metal Systems/ Inc. 
The overall issue will turn on the following two sub-issues: 
1. Whether the Industrial Commission erred when it concluded 
that the applicant did not suffer an injury arising out of and in 
the course of his employment with Sheet Metal Systems, on 
December 7, 1993, even though the applicant injured his back on 
that day jumping from a four-foot roof. 
This requires review of the Commission's application of law to 
a set of facts. The Industrial Commission has some discretion in 
determining whether the test for "arising out of" the employment 
has been met, Drake v. Indus. Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 
1997), but appellate courts review the Commission's application of 
law under a correction-of-error standard. Id. at 181; Crapo v. 
Indus. Comm'n, 922 P.2d 39 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-16(d) (1997). 
This issue was raised before the Administrative Law Judge and 
the Industrial Commission. R. 575-90. 
2. Whether the Industrial Commission erred in finding that 
the applicant "effectively" jumped from a height of only eighteen 
inches. 
This issue requires review of the Industrial Commission's 
factual findings. The court of appeals will reverse such findings 
if they are not "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole record before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-16(g). 
This issue was raised before the Administrative Law Judge and 
the Industrial Commission. R. 575-90. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (198811 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured 
and the dependents of each such employee who is killed/ 
by accident arising out of and in the course of his 
employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the 
accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid 
xThis is the governing statute as in effect on December 7, 
1993, the date of the injury which is the subject of this appeal. 
See, e.g. , Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Indus. Comm'n, 328 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah October 14, 1997) ("the law existing at the 
time of the injury applies in relation to that injury"). This 
statute has been amended and recodified at Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
401 (1997). 
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compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury 
or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and 
hospital services and medicines, and, in case of death, 
such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this 
chapter. The responsibility for compensation and payment 
of medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, 
and funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be 
on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on the 
employee. 
Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-16 (1997) 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or 
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final 
agency action resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, 
on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that 
a person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(d) The agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law; 
(g) The agency action is based on a determina-
tion of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of 
the whole record before the court; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a Petition for Review of an Order by the Utah Indus-
trial Commission that (1) held Petitioners Utah Tile and Roofing 
Company and its insurance carrier, CNA Insurance Company, solely 
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liable to pay workers' compensation benefits to Respondent Kevin T. 
Day; and (2) held that Respondents Sheet Metal Systems, Inc.f and 
Transamerica Premier Insurance are not liable to pay the applicant 
any workers' compensation benefits for the back injury he suffered 
while working for Sheet Metal Systems on December 7, 1993. 
Course of Proceedings 
Respondent Kevin T. Day ("the applicant") instituted proceed-
ings before the Industrial Commission of Utah by filing four Appli-
cations for Hearing seeking workers' compensation benefits from 
Petitioners Utah Tile and Roofing Company and CNA Insurance Company 
(collectively referred to as "Utah Tile"), and from Respondents 
Sheet Metal Systems, Inc., and Transamerica Premier Insurance 
("Sheet Metal Systems"). R. 008, 043, 077, 111. Three of these 
applications sought benefits for industrial accidents allegedly 
sustained while the applicant worked for Utah Tile in March 1992 
and January 1993. The other application sought benefits from Sheet 
Metal Systems for an industrial accident occurring on December 7, 
1993. 
The four cases were consolidated, and a hearing took place on 
March 10, 1995, in front of the Honorable Benjamin A. Sims, Admin-
istrative Law Judge of the Industrial Commission. Transcript, R. 
248-358. On November 18, 1996,2 Judge Sims issued Findings of 
2Judge Sims had previously issued an Order denying compen-
sation, but the applicant sought review by the Industrial 
Commission, and the Commission remanded the matter to Judge Sims 
for referral to a medical panel. 
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Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an Order, which dismissed the claim 
against Sheet Metal Systems. R. 565-74 (Addendum Exhibit 1). 
Judge Sims concluded that the injuries the applicant suffered on 
December 7, 1993, while he worked for Sheet Metal Systems, were not 
legally caused by his employment, because they did not result from 
an "unusual exertion" as required by Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). R. 571. The Order further 
provided that Utah Tile was solely liable to pay the applicant 
temporary total disability compensation, permanent partial 
impairment compensation, and medical expenses, including 
compensation and expenses for the injuries precipitated by the 
December 1993 Sheet Metal Systems accident. R. 572. 
Utah Tile filed a timely Motion for Review. R. 575-90. In an 
Order issued May 1, 1997, the Industrial Commission denied the 
motion, adopting the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. R. 624-27 (Addendum Exhibit 2). Utah Tile 
then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Commission on June 
17, 1997. R. 629-37. The Industrial Commission ruled on this 
motion on July 29, 1997, finding good cause to extend the time for 
requesting reconsideration pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9) 
(1997), because the Order denying the motion for review had not 
been mailed to Utah Tile's counsel. R. 645-46. The Commission, 
however, denied the motion for reconsideration on the merits. Id. 
Utah Tile then filed a timely Petition for Review on August 
28, 1997, and a docketing statement on September 17, 1997. R. 657-
58, 664-712. 
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Statement of Facts 
Respondent Kevin T. Day ("the applicant") seriously injured 
his back on December 7, 1993, while working as a sheet metal 
mechanic for Respondent Sheet Metal Systems, Inc. On that day, he 
was working on a garage roof approximately four feet high. 
Transcript of Hearing, R. 277:8-23 (pertinent portions of this 
transcript are reproduced at Addendum Exhibit 3) . To get down, the 
applicant was required to jump off. Id. He jumped off the roof, 
landed on his feet, and immediately felt "excruciating pain," which 
soon worsened to the point where it became "unbearable." Id. ; 
Transcript, R. 324:11 - 325:1. Six days after the applicant jumped 
off the roof, an MRI scan revealed that he had a herniated disk in 
his lumbar spine at level L5-S1. MRI Report, R. 378. The 
applicant was temporarily totally disabled from December 7, 1993, 
until he was released to work light duty on August 2, 1994. 
Finding of Fact 16(c)(4), R. 570 (Addendum Exhibit 3). 
In March 1992, the applicant had suffered a back injury while 
working for Petitioner Utah Tile and Roofing. Findings 1-3, R. 
567. He was diagnosed as having a ligamentous injury, with 
tenderness over L3. Physician's Initial Report of Work Injury, R. 
434. X-rays were normal. Id.; Radiology Report, R. 362. He was 
off for about five days, after which time he returned to work for 
nearly ten months without limitations. Transcript, R. 290:14-18. 
He did not report any back pain to anyone at Utah Tile during that 
period, nor did he seek treatment for his back. Id., R. 270:25 -
271:3, 291:2-7. Then, in January 1993, the applicant suffered 
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another incident, when he slipped on some ice and landed on his 
buttocks. Finding 5, R. 567-68. He was again released to full 
duty work five days later, with a medical report saying that he was 
"100 percent improved." Id. 
The applicant subsequently worked, full duty, for another nine 
and a half months. Transcript, R. 296:20 - 297:13. He quit 
working for Utah Tile in June or July 1993 to go work for another 
company, Nesco, for higher pay. 297:3-5. He worked for Nesco for 
another few months, full time, without any problems. 297:6-8. 
On October 27, 1993, at least three or four months after he 
had stopped working for Utah Tile, the applicant went to see Dr. 
John Schlegel. He complained of "persistent" back pain, but he did 
not mention any leg pain or numbness. Letter from Dr. Schlegel, R. 
377. In fact, he filled out a Patient History Form and a Pain 
Drawing, and he did not indicate leg pain or numbness on either 
one. R. 374-76. Dr. Schlegel examined him and reported that a 
straight leg raise test was "negative bilaterally." Dr. Schlegel 
Letter, R. 377. X-rays were again normal. Radiology Report, R. 
441. The applicant was able to return to work once again. 
However, three days after jumping off the roof on December 7, 
1993, the applicant returned to Dr. Schlegel. At this time, he 
reported that he had "fallen" from the four-foot roof onto his 
feet. Dr. Schlegel Note, R. 371. Significantly, for the first 
time, he reported leg weakness, numbness, and pain. Id.; Pain 
Drawing of 12/16/93, R. 372. In fact, on December 16, nine days 
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after falling off the roof, he rated his leg pain as a 7 on a scale 
of 0 to 10. Pain Drawing, R. 372. 
Following the December 7 injury, the applicant's back and leg 
pain continued to worsen. E.g., Dr. Schlegel Note of 1/5/94, R. 
373; Pain Drawing of 1/5/94, R. 380. He wanted Utah Tile to pay 
for surgery, but authorization was denied after it became apparent 
that the applicant's recent increase in back pain and the onset of 
pain radiating to his legs had been precipitated by the injury the 
applicant suffered working for Sheet Metal Systems, and not by 
injuries the applicant had suffered working for Utah Tile over a 
year and a half earlier. Transcript, R. 280:7-13. The previous 
injury appeared from the medical records to be tenderness at level 
L3, with no nerve involvement or radiation into the legs. After 
December 7, however, his pain was coming from the L5-S1 level, and 
did radiate into his legs. It is not clear whether the applicant 
sought authorization for his surgery from Sheet Metal Systems. At 
any rate, the applicant underwent conservative treatment, and he 
was returned to work status on August 3, 1994. Finding 16(b), R. 
569. 
The applicant subsequently filed Applications for Hearing 
against both Utah Tile and Sheet Metal Systems. At the hearing, 
the applicant testified concerning his medical history. He 
acknowledged that, with the exception of the five-day period in 
January 1993, he had not missed any work due to his back from March 
1992 until December 7, 1993, a period of over twenty months. 
Transcript, R. 290:14-18, 296:20 - 297:8. He also acknowledged 
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that, with the exception of the five-day period in January 1993, he 
had not sought any treatment for his back from March 1992 until 
October 1993, which was well after he had stopped working for Utah 
Tile- R. 270:25 - 271:3, 275:3-11, 291:2-7. 
The applicant also testified regarding the injury he suffered 
while working for Sheet Metal Systems. Initially, he testified 
that he simply "hopped" off the roof and felt excruciating pain. 
R. 277:17-23 (Addendum Exhibit 3). Later in his testimony, he 
again described his actions as "hopping" off the roof. R. 280:11-
13, 316:2-3. And when he was asked if he had "jumped" off the 
roof, he responded, "That's what happened." R. 315:13-21. 
On cross-examination, the applicant explained that, before 
jumping, he squatted down and put his hands on the roof. R. 
316:16-18. The Administrative Law Judge, however, found that the 
applicant had actually used his arms to "lower himself" to the 
ground. Finding 7, R. 568. The ALJ then took the four-foot height 
of the wall, noted that the applicant had a thirty-two inch inseam, 
and concluded that the applicant actually jumped from an 
"effective" height of only one and a half feet. Id. The judge 
also found that the ground was soft, and that the applicant is a 
"trained Army parachutist who knows how to do a parachute landing 
fall, and knows how to jump from aircraft in flight without 
injuring himself." Finding 8, R. 568. The judge further found 
that the applicant used the parachute landing maneuver when he 
dropped from the roof. Id. 
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Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge con-
cluded that the December 7, 1993, injury did not result from an 
"unusual exertion." Conclusion of Law 1, R. 571. Therefore, the 
applicant's employment with Sheet Metal Systems did not legally 
cause the injury that resulted from jumping from the roof. The 
Judge did find, however, that the injury suffered from jumping off 
the roof was one-third responsible for the temporary total 
disability that followed, and was also one-third responsible for 
the applicant's permanent partial impairment and need for medical 
treatment. Findings 16(c)(4), 16(d), 16(f), 24, R. 570-71. 
Nevertheless, the Administrative Law Judge entered an order 
dismissing Sheet Metal Systems and finding Utah Tile liable to pay 
the compensation that resulted from the jump from the roof. Order, 
R. 572. The Commission adopted these findings and conclusions in 
its order denying Utah Tile's motion for review. R. 624-25. 
Utah Tile has since paid the applicant's compensation, as 
ordered by the Commission. Utah Tile now brings this appeal, 
however, seeking an order requiring Sheet Metal Systems to fulfill 
its obligations under the Workers' Compensation Act. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah Tile is not liable to pay for the bulk of the applicant's 
workers' compensation benefits because the applicant's eight-month 
period of temporary total disability was precipitated by the injury 
the applicant suffered while working for Sheet Metal Systems. When 
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with the typical person in today's society. Jumping off a four-
foot roof is clearly an unusual exertion, because the typical 
person in today's society does not regularly jump off four-foot 
heights. 
There is no evidence to support the Commission's finding that 
the applicant really jumped from an "effective" height of eighteen 
inches. The Administrative Law Judge found that the applicant had 
used his arms to lower himself partway to the ground, but that is 
not what the applicant himself testified to. The applicant merely 
stated that he had squatted and put his hands on the roof before 
jumping. The applicant did not state that he used his arms in any 
way to lower himself toward the ground. In fact, the applicant 
repeatedly stated that he simply "hopped" or "jumped" off the roof, 
which belies the ALJ's finding. Because this finding is not 
supported by substantial evidence in the record, it cannot stand. 
In addition, because the Commission's conclusion regarding legal 
causation was based almost entirely on this finding, that 
conclusion must be reversed. 
The purpose of the unusual exertion test is to ensure that 
compensation is not awarded for symptoms that "coincidentally" 
appear during working hours. But this is not a situation where 
symptoms just "happened" to appear at work, while the applicant was 
doing an ordinary activity that any of us are likely to be doing on 
our own time. Rather, the applicant's injury resulted from a 
specific risk of his employment t it was the fact that he worked on 
roofs that required him to jump off the roof, and it was jumping 
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off the roof that caused his injury. And, as noted above, 'imping 
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findings, and as such it must be reversed. 
A. If an employee suffers successive industrial accidents. 
the employer at the time of the last accident is solely 
liable for any resulting disability. 
The Utah Workers7 Compensation Act does not provide for 
apportionment of compensation. Therefore, when an employee suffers 
a disability due to successive industrial accidents, the employer 
at the time of the last accident is solely liable for the resulting 
temporary total disability. Mountain States Steel Co. v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 535 P.2d 1249 (Utah 1975); Duaine Brown Chevrolet Co. v. 
Indus. Comm'n, 29 Utah 2d 478, 511 P.2d 743 (1973). In addition, 
the employer at the time of the last accident must pay its 
proportionate share of medical expenses arising from that accident. 
E.g. . U.S.F. & G. v. Indus. Comm'n, 657 P.2d 764 (Utah 1983). 
Finally, the last employer is also liable to pay compensation for 
the entire permanent partial impairment, though that employer need 
not pay compensation for any impairment that existed prior to an 
industrial accident. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-66 (Supp. 1993) 
(recodified at Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-412(6)(c)(ii) (1997)). 
Therefore, Sheet Metal Systems, as the employer at the time of the 
applicant's last industrial accident, is liable for the entire 
amount of temporary disability following that accident, as well as 
for its proportionate share of medical expenses and permanent 
partial impairment compensation. 
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B. The applicant's last^ iniurv. suffered while working for 
Sheet Metal Systems on December 7, 1993, was a 
compensable accident under the Utah Workers ' Compensation 
Act* 
The Industrial Commission did not attribute any liability to 
Sin,"I • I Metal Systems because i mproper -j concluded I::l: la t: t:l: i 2 
app I
 t " ^i.,- rne 
Commission felt that the applicant's injur - aid n*. . arise out of 
his employment with Sheet Meta^ -t^m« w vovpr * M ^ conclusion 
i i< 
Under the Workers' Compensation Act, an employee is entitled 
to compensation and medical expenses for a m *njury "arisina ™J+~ of 
< i II , I :ii i: I t:l: in E: • 3 :: n lr s s :: f I: :i I s • :: r h s i: s mp 
1-45 (1988) (i: ecodified at Utah Code Ann. $ ^4A-2-a n 
Allen v. Industrial Commission, the Utah ^ ir-remp ^urt i~ v i ~d 
tha I: • 2 Dmpe i: i 3a t:i :: i: i ; i :: i n ] d t s a\ ; ai: ci s ::i i L. e 
was a "sufficient causal connection" between the employment and the 
injury. 729 P.2d 15, 24-25 \ LJta •• • further 
: o r e 
at -,,- - , .uedically caused and legall * ased b e 
employment. Id, at 25. ! 
f 
through n«^ ..*o iedically diid legally -a / 
the back injur fe suffered jumping off thf "inf wh U *••'« ^ • r 
Sheet Met- • ~^" ••' • " • n 
the course ui trie applicant - , nt w u n Sheet *?•<-. -t-ms, 
and Sheet Metal Systems is liable to r^,r ~ -pensation. 
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1. The injury suffered jumping off the roof on 
December 7, 1993, medically caused the applicant's 
subsequent disability and need for medical 
treatment. 
First, the December 7, 1993, incident was a medical cause of 
the disability and medical expenses the applicant sustained 
following that date. To satisfy the medical causation requirement, 
an employee need only demonstrate a "causal connection" between the 
injury and the resulting disability. Allen, 729 P.2d at 27. The 
connection need not be "significant"; any causal relationship is 
sufficient. Willardson v. Indus. Comm'n, 856 P.2d 371, 376 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993), rev'd on other grounds 904 P.2d 671 (Utah 1995). 
And while neither the Administrative Law Judge nor the Commission 
specifically addressed medical causation, the Administrative Law 
Judge did make findings of fact, adopted by the Commission, that 
conclusively establish that the December 1993 incident was in fact 
a medical cause of the applicant's disability. 
For example, the Administrative Law Judge specifically adopted 
the findings of the medical panel that the applicant's disability 
from December 1993 to August 1994 was one-third attributable to the 
December 1993 injury. Findings of Fact 16(c)(4), 24, R. 570-71 
(Addendum Exhibit 1). In addition, the Administrative Law Judge 
expressly found that the applicant's permanent partial impairment 
and need for medical treatment were likewise one-third attributable 
to the December 1993 injury. Findings 16(d), 16(f), 24, R. 570-71. 
These findings conclusively establish a medical causal connection 
-16-
between th« ~ v* - -^ ~-* accident and the disability "" t 
followed. 
I III III I I I III III III III III III III III I U N I III I II h i I I I I | I I III 1 < 1 III III II III 1 III Ml III III III III III l i l t I 1 i l l ; I ' U S 
+-u~r are supported by substantial evidence. E.g. , Helf v. I; 
Comm'n, -i 1 P.2d 101 « 'ah C* (medical causation 
i j i 
standard .-* ,. iheie ^& niuic titan enough * / idence to support 9 
Commission ' J : indings - - egard 1 1 :: 3 t: significantly t::]l: 1 3 
a p ^ . " * :c .1 1 1: ; I,;I ::  r ill ::: til lit s 1  in tit Il a f t sz h e 
suf f ered the December 1993 in j ury. Prior tc • tl: 1a t: time, 1: le had 
missed a total of five day's of work due to his back between March 
^ecemh -r • ] 993 , a peri od of over twen ty mon ths I i nci :i ngs 
t. 1 !ki 1 :i by December II ' Ill 993, :i t had been near ] 3 t: =1 n 
f u. . months since the applicant had missed any time because of back 
r,a\- Transcript I t 296 2 0 29 7:8; F. i n 3 il " ::j Il 5, I Il: 5)6 68 Bi it 
. . . -;wing the I) = • :: = mt = i: 1 9 93 incident, the applicai 1 t: fc • s • ::: EII me 
completely unable to work, and he was not released to work, even 
light I!:::i ] t l : .€ f :: •] 11 • : • ; ; :i 1: :ii. : j Ai 1 g 1  is 1: Fi 1: 1 ::i il 1:1 3 11 2 1 1 569 . 
. *. MwiaiLxOi i, i 1: M as no t until after the December 1993 ii icident 
that t he applicant reported pain radiating into I: 1 :ii s legs. For 
example, the pain d :i agr a 1:1:1 tl: 1 = a :]:: p 3 :i • ::  a 1 1 1: fii Il lli! s ::i :: 1 1 t: • :: 1: :t C)L ::: t , 
- -*- not repor t any ] eg pain or numbness. Ratient History 
Form, Pain Drawing of 10/27/93, R. 3 74- 76 S I xaight-leg raising at 
1" hilt t imp v.i /'. ] 1 1 1 1 • • : f D 
I " ' III1111 a t t b i . * --aiLiei xe a p p l i c a n t . i m p o r t e d p a i n ; ^ . j 
down b o t h l e g t , ^c „ _ . w „ _ — a l e of 0 t v -w- * ~^.** W J . u r » x ^ o f 
12/16/93, R. 372. And within a week, an MRI revealed that the 
applicant had a herniated disk* MRI Report, R. 378. 
In short, while the Administrative Law Judge did not specific-
ally address medical causation, he did make specific findings of 
fact, and those findings, which are supported by substantial 
evidence, including the medical panel report, demonstrate a clear 
medical connection between the December 1993 incident and the 
disability that followed. As a result, the medical cause prong of 
the Allen test has been satisfied. 
2. The December 7, 1993, incident was a legal cause of 
the applicant's subsequent disability. because 
jumping off a four-foot roof involves an unusual 
exertion. 
As noted above, to demonstrate that an industrial injury arose 
out of and in the course of employment, an employee has to 
demonstrate that the employment is both the medical cause and the 
legal cause of the resulting disability and need for medical 
treatment. As established in the previous section, there is no 
real question about medical causation, based on the Administrative 
Law Judge's findings of fact. Therefore, this case will turn on 
legal causation. 
Even if an employee suffers from a preexisting condition, an 
industrial accident that aggravates or lights up that condition 
will be considered the legal cause of the aggravation if the 
employment "contributed something substantial to increase the risk 
he already faced in everyday life because of his condition." 
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Allen, " " ?;~T at 25* That is, the employee will be compensated 
if his r* '--^r ;"iv.r*- r^rulted from any "exertion qreater than that 
Ulidei Lcit- /• .
 u .....j _.i_- > nnr casp- * ^ 
applicant was required to jump off roir -toe . without .: 
ladder or any other equipment ?n1°lv because of omployment 
1
 < i" i I !i 1'1'iri"11 field I !- Si ' T" ea ter 
Mi "ill any undertaken ..ormal, everyday life. 
Jumping off a roof i? entirely different from the s^rts of 
• K 
law. Allen itsej.. > - .,-. - ^  Oourt listed several exam-
Lr.^ t- ^t wi.d* * considered r-. b** typica1 n^ ri employment activities. 
d 
include taking i i m gctijjage cans to tii* stree . :- . 
carrying baggage for travel . nhanginq a f la* * * rp <-v a? -** • ^ le, 
n 
ju.idingo. xa. at ^o«, iuese are a n activities nat members of 
our society engage in on a more-or-less r<=-nlar b«sis. However, 
e 
;:...i. these eve. ,,ctivitieir - n L requi*-
ordinary . : .- . activities withi apartme 
1 
ai;a tamilv
 i( Leraction, o*. any uthci activity ne typical 
late-twentieth century individual regularly engages in, t • -• , 
1 
require such d j LII 111 
-19-
In fact, jumping from four feet has specifically been held to 
be an unusual exertion. In Miera v. Industrial Commission, 728 
P.2d 1023 (Utah 1986), the injured employee aggravated a back 
injury by jumping into an eight-foot pit that had a shelf at the 
four-foot level. He made this series of four-foot jumps eight 
times in four hours. The court reversed the Commission's denial of 
benefits, holding that the four-foot jumps "constitute a consid-
erably greater exertion than that encountered in non-employment 
life." Idk. at 1024-25. 
Just as in Miera, the applicant's actions here constituted a 
considerably greater exertion than that encountered in normal, 
everyday life. The applicant in Miera made more than one jump, but 
our case deserves the same result. There was nothing in the 
reasoning of Miera to suggest that the number of jumps was particu-
larly significant. Further, there is no evidence in our case that 
the applicant got off the roof only once; it is more likely that he 
would have gotten on and off the roof several times during the 
course of a work day. Moreover, given that this was an impact 
injury, and not a cumulative effect injury, the number of jumps 
would not really be relevant. 
However, the Administrative Law Judge and the Commission 
concluded that the applicant's jump from the four-foot roof did not 
constitute an unusual exertion. But neither the ALJ nor the 
Commission mentioned any everyday activities that would involve a 
four-foot jump. Instead, the ALJ, whose findings were adopted by 
the Commission, found that (1) the "effective height" from which 
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the applicant jumped was only a foot and a half; the applic. 
was a trained parachutist; (3) th^ *op]icant 
] and :ii i 1 j f = ] ] ; ;  1 1 = i 1 1 I = • ] ai ided; = J: I :i ( I) 
7 ai id 8 „, R. • 568 (Addendum Exhibi I: 11 M on tr^se four f acts, 
the ALJ concluded that the applicants as ot an unusual 
postulated ladl ,i about wes u., .vditjn 
stepping off a platform or footstool, or sliding .: he bed of a 
oicV 
***-., -«.*..*.-, .. . . reverie' iu ^^ y x. L * -J= JL 
applicant "effectively * ped fi • K height of eighteen . ., es, is 
"• * lUDDorte : ' ' bstar * ' ?r-
ract ,__ -.M. ... ioui i ^ l jui,r ^ _*. tour-toot jump, i l :: 1: an eighteen-" 
inch _ _ , , d because this findinq forms the basis for the legal 
conclusion that the ; t:i • :: i i. t h , = I: 
elusion is incorrect and a~ ~~«., -*^ s.winmissxoi l's disci: etion. 
a» There is no evidence to support the findinq 
that the applicant effectively jumped from a 
height of only eighteen inches. 
The applies* testified at the hearing that he put his han :1s 
on the re-*- *- squatted 4~-
testimony, ^ t-nni ^ „ ^ w x , juijuauu 
length of the applicarr inseam, and cam* up wi : c* i > * 
half Tl" ^  Commissi-- - u 
a hi le this theory may have «. certain superficial logic 
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does not reflect physical reality, and it is certainly not 
supported by the evidence. 
The strain involved in a jump depends in large part on the 
speed at which the person impacts the ground. So the only way the 
applicant's jump from the four-foot roof could be the equivalent to 
a jump of eighteen inches is if the applicant was at a complete 
stop when his feet were eighteen inches above the ground. To do 
this, the applicant would have had to use his arms to suspend 
himself above the ground and then to let go. There is no evidence 
that he did this; indeed, the evidence, when looked at as a whole, 
clearly shows that he did not jump in this fashion. 
The evidence the Commission apparently relied on was the 
applicant's testimony at the March 10, 1995, hearing. But nowhere 
in this testimony does the applicant say that he used his arms to 
stop himself while in the process of jumping off the roof. The 
applicant testified as follows;; 
Q: Mr. Day, let's talk about the accident of 
December 7 th of 1993 while you were working for my 
client, which is Sheet Metal Systems. 
A: Okay. 
Q: The employer's E-l, which you probably haven't 
seen, it's the employer's first report of injury, 
indicates that, in your words - this is what you told 
them - that you were (inaudible) off this room and you 
jumped about four feet and landed on some soft dirt." Is 
that what you told them? 
A: That's right. 
Q: And that's what happened? 
A: That's what happened. 
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"et's talk about how you actually jumped down 
off of urns. I am going to risk my own workers' comp 
injury riqht now because I am going to stand up on this 
thing - "our Honor? 
bent down at the knees and put one hand on 
the roof and hopped up. 
here's a p^inh • want to make, though. 
Q [By Mr. Sturdy]: So you are on this roof; I s that 
Q: And so one of the theories, suppose, is * 
you just jumped dov/n from this height, four feet 
that'« not* hOTJ 11 h^p^^"°d? 
You squatted down on your hands and then jumpt . 
like this; : *- * *"at right? : 
A: Exactly. How did ^t? 
Q: - . .. 
A: Okay. 
Q: How long are your legs? 
• ' • . 
Q: No, your inseam. 
A: 
n #
 a. iigtit. So you have a 32-inch iriBeam. So 
when j „ at this point on your hands and jumped down, 
your legs pretty much covered the distance for you, 
didn't they? 
A: Just ab 
48 inches, 32-inch inseam, and * a^uuany about 
16 ' ' *> right? 
- 2 3 -
A: That sounds right. 
Q: Okay, Check my math. 
JUDGE SIMS: Are you going to use the airborne 
(inaudible) -
MR. STURDY: Your Honor, I would hurt myself if I 
did that anymore. 
Transcript, R. 315:9 - 317:16 (emphasis added) (Addendum Exhibit 
As the court can plainly see, the applicant never said that he 
used his hands and arms to stop himself when his feet were one and 
a half feet above the ground. Indeed, he did not even say that he 
used his arms to slow himself down. He simply stated that he 
squatted down and put his hands on the roof before he jumped. 
Therefore, the inference cannot be made that the applicants jump 
was "effectively" from one and a half feet. 
The ALJ made the following finding: 
7. On December 7, 1993, Mr. Day used his hands to 
assist him in getting off of a four feet high wall while 
working for Sheet Metal Systems. He squatted down, 
placed the palms of his hands on either side of his feet, 
and used his hands and arms to lower his body straight 
down to the ground which was soft because it had been 
plowed. He claims that this injured his back. The 
evidence shows that the effective height from which he 
jumped was about one and one-half feet. The applicant 
argued that this was a jump from four feet. The evidence 
shows that it was clearly not a clean jump from four 
feet, and that Mr. Day used his hands and arms to assist 
him to lower himself to the ground from the four foot 
height. 
R. 568 (emphasis added). 
As noted above, there is nothing in the evidence to suggest 
that the applicant used his arms and hands to "lower" himself to 
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the ground.3 In fact, the evidence reveals that the applicant's 
jump from the roof was nothing like the slow, deliberate process 
contemplated by the ALJ's finding.4 Probably the most significant 
evidence is that the applicant repeatedly testified that he simply 
"hopped" off the roof. When he first described the accident, he 
stated that he "hopped off and landed on both feet but experienced 
excruciating pain." Transcript, R. 277:17-20. Later, he referred 
to his actions as "hopping off the four-foot roof at Sheet Metal 
Systems." R. 280:12-13. And in the testimony quoted previously, 
the applicant explained that, when getting off the roof, he "bent 
down at the knees and put one hand on the roof and hopped up." R. 
316:2-3. It is highly doubtful that, if the applicant had actually 
used the prolonged, careful process described by the ALJ and the 
Commission, he would keep describing his jump as a "hop." 
Other evidence also contradicts the Commission's finding. 
When the applicant first sought treatment, three days after the 
accident, he described his jump as a "fall" onto his feet. Notes 
3The portion of the testimony set forth in the text is the 
only evidence that even arguably supports the Commission's finding. 
However, in case the court concludes that additional evidence is to 
be marshaled, the applicant's jump is also discussed in the 
Transcript at 277:8 - 278:5, 303:7 - 305:1, and 322:15 - 324:4, and 
in the medical records at R. 371. But none of these portions even 
refers to the applicant's use of his hands or arms when jumping 
from the roof. These portions of the transcript are reproduced at 
Addendum Exhibit 3. 
4Under UAPA, the appellate court looks at the "whole record" 
in reviewing an agency's findings of fact. Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-16(g) (1997). This requires the court to consider not only 
evidence supporting the findings, but also all evidence that 
contradicts the findings. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 
776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
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of Dr. Schlegel, R. 371. The Employer's First Report of Injury for 
the accident stated that the applicant "jumped" about four feet, 
and the applicant testified that "[t]hat's what happened." Tran-
script, R. 315:21. And the AL.J himself found that the applicant 
was required to use a "parachute landing fall," which also reveals 
that this was more than just a small drop of a foot and a half. 
Finding 8, R. 568. 
There is simply no evidence that the applicant lowered himself 
to the ground or did anything else to effectively reduce the 
distance he had to jump. And there is plenty of evidence to the 
contrary. The Commission has the discretion to make factual 
findings, but its findings must be based on substantial evidence. 
This is not a matter of a conflicting evidence, or of inconsistent 
inferences that could be drawn from the same evidence. Here, there 
is no evidence to support the Commission's finding that the jump 
was effectively one from eighteen inches. Therefore, that finding 
cannot stand. 
b. The other facts found by the Commission do not 
support the legal conclusion that jumping off 
a roof is not an unusual exertion. 
In addition to the finding regarding the effective height of 
the jump, the Administrative Law Judge found that the jump was not 
an unusual exertion because (1) the applicant was a trained 
parachutist, (2) the applicant used the parachute landing fall, and 
(3) the ground was soft. Findings 7 and 8, R. 568. Once again, 
these findings were adopted by the Commission. But these findings, 
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while themselves supported by substantial evidence, do not support 
the Commission's ultimate conclusion regarding legal causation. 
First, the fact that the applicant is a trained parachutist is 
completely irrelevant to the determination of whether jumping off 
a roof is an unusual activity. Judge Sims evidently reasoned that, 
because the applicant is a former paratrooper, he knows how to jump 
without hurting himself. See Finding 8, R. 568. But an objective 
standard is used in determining whether a strain or activity is 
unusual: the proper test is to consider what the employee did, and 
to determine if that activity is comparable to activities normally 
engaged in by the general public. "The focus is on what typical 
nonemployment activities are generally expected of people in 
today's society, not what this particular claimant is accustomed to 
doing." Allen, 729 P.2d at 26. Moreover, the judge's reasoning is 
obviously incorrect, because the applicant did hurt himself doing 
this jumping. In fact, he testified that he felt "excruciating" 
pain from the jump, which soon went to being "unbearable." 
Transcript, R. 324:11 - 325:1. It is doubtful that such a dramatic 
effect could result from a normal, run-of-the-mill activity. 
Second, the use of the parachute landing fall actually weakens 
the Commission's conclusion. The parachute landing fall, a 
specialized maneuver, is itself an unusual activity.5 It is 
5Utah Tile does not challenge the finding that the applicant 
used a parachute landing fall, so there is no requirement that Utah 
Tile marshal the evidence supporting that finding. Instead, we are 
challenging the Commission's inferences from that fact. Since 
these inferences are not supported by any evidence (i.e., there is 
no evidence that a parachute landing fall is a normal activity), 
there is no evidence to marshal. At any rate, the discussion of 
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telling that Sheet Metal Systems' own attorney even remarked that 
he would "hurt [him]self" if he "did that anymore," Transcript, R. 
317:15-16. The mere fact that Mr. Sturdy made that statement, even 
in jest, proves that such a maneuver is simply not something people 
do on a regular basis. And, of course, the fact that such a 
maneuver was necessary shows that the applicant's drop was not a 
minor one. 
Third, the Commission's finding that the ground was soft does 
not provide much support for its conclusion regarding legal 
causation. For people simply do not ordinarily jump off four-foot 
heights, no matter how soft the ground is. In addition, jumping 
onto soft ground may actually increase the strain on the back, 
because it may cause an uneven or awkward landing. 
As discussed previously, the Commission compared jumping 
eighteen inches to stepping off a platform or footstool, or sliding 
from a pickup truck bed. R. 625. Of course, this reasoning cannot 
prevail, since the finding regarding the eighteen inches was not 
supported by the evidence. In addition, when a person steps down 
from a platform or footstool, he or she can use one leg to lower 
his or her body at least part of the distance. And sliding off a 
truck bed is similarly not comparable to jumping from a roof. 
Truck beds are not four feet high, and if they are, it is difficult 
to imagine too many people sliding off them. And if one is going 
to "slide" from a truck bed, one would ordinarily begin from a 
the parachute landing fall appears in the Transcript at 317:13-21, 
322:15 - 324:4. 
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sitting position, with the legs dangling down. In other words, in 
the examples given by the Commission, the equivalent height of the 
drops actually is reduced. 
A jump from a four-foot roof is still a jump from a four-foot 
roof. Even when done cautiously, it still requires a landing that 
puts a strain on the body. And the simple fact is that people just 
do not jump from four-foot heights as part of their normal 
routines. 
The purpose of the unusual exertion test is to "distinguish 
those injuries which (a) coincidentally occur at work because a 
preexisting condition results in symptoms which appear during work 
hours without any enhancement from the workplace, and (b) those 
injuries which occur because some condition or exertion required by 
the employment increases the risk of injury which the worker 
normally faces in everyday life." Allen, 729 P.2d at 25 (emphasis 
added). In our case, the applicant's injury did not just "happen" 
to appear during work hours, while he was doing something that any 
of us would have been likely to be doing on our own time. Instead, 
the injury directly resulted from a specific risk of the appli-
cant's employment: having to jump off of roofs. The applicant's 
back injury was thus a result of an increased risk specifically 
created by his employment, and as such it must be compensated by 
the recipient of the benefit of the employment, Sheet Metal 
Systems. 
The injury the applicant suffered on December 7, 1993, was 
both the legal and medical cause of the disability and need for 
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medical expenses that followed. As a result, Sheet Metal Systems 
is required to pay all of the applicant's temporary total 
disability compensation, and it must pay its proportionate share of 
the medical expenses and permanent partial impairment compensation. 
The Commission's order, holding Utah Tile solely liable for the 
compensation and medical expenses, is based on findings that are 
not supported by substantial evidence in the record, and as such 
the order is an abuse of discretion and must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioners Utah Tile and Roofing and Transportation Insurance 
Company therefore respectfully request that this court vacate the 
order of May 1, 1997, and remand the matter to the Labor Commission 
with directions to enter an order that Respondent Sheet Metal 
Systems is required to pay (1) all temporary total disability 
arising from the December 7, 1993, accident; (2) one-third of the 
medical expenses resulting from the December 1993 accident; and (3) 
one-third of the applicant's permanent partial impairment compensa-
tion. Utah Tile further requests that Sheet Metal Systems be 
required to reimburse Utah Tile for any amounts already paid that 
are properly the responsibility of Sheet Metal Systems. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of November, 1997. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE 
TtfEODORE E. KANELL 
STEPHEN P. HORVAT 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on March 10, 1995, 
at 1:00 o'clock p.m. The hearing was held pursuant to 
Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Benjamin A. Sims, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The applicant, Kevin T. Day, was present and 
was represented by Preston T. Handy, Attorney at Law. 
The defendants, Utah Tile & Roofing and CNA Insurance 
Company, were represented by Theodore T. Kanell, 
Attorney at Law. 
The defendants, Sheet Metal Systems and Transamerica 
Premier Insurance, were represented by Thomas C. 
Sturdy, Attorney at Law. 
An Order was issued in this case on May 25, 1995. A Motion for 
Review was filed with the Industrial Commission of Utah. The Motion 
was granted and an Order of Remand was issued on February 5, 1996. 
These cases involve four applications for hearing by Kevin T. 
Day who was born September 28, 1966. He was married and had three 
dependant children under age 18 at the time of the various alleged 
injuries. Each case and its allegations will be briefly discussed. 
Case Number 94902 alleges that the applicant, Kevin T. Day, was 
employed by Utah Tile and Roofing on March 19, 1992 to work on 
Smith's Store, and while "lifting 1/2 of a 300-lb. roll of rubber, 
the person assisting [Mr. Day] dropped his side, giving [Mr. Day] 
all of the weight. [He] felt two pops in [his] back, and let (sic) 
[his] side of the roll fall.11 Application for Hearing (8/25/94). 
Mr. Day claims that he incurred a ruptured disc and small fracture, 
that he was off work as a result of the injury from March 19, 1992 
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to March 24, 1992, and again from February 23, 1994 to the present. 
Case Number 94903 involves the same defendants. Mr. Day claims 
that on March 25, 1992 he was working on a K-Mart Store. He was 
lifting a "single piece of hold down metal which weighed approxi-
mately 2 lbs. [He] twisted and raised [his] arms, and then 
experienced sharp pain in [his] lower back and through [his] hips." 
Application for Hearing (10/7/94). He alleges an injury to his 
lower back, but alleges no time off as a result. He claims the same 
wage rate and hours. 
Case Number 94904 again involves the same defendants. Mr. Day 
alleges this industrial accident occurred on January 13, 1993 while 
working on Albertson,s. He claims the accident occurred when he was 
"carrying approximately 100 lbs of metal across [his] shoulder. 
While carrying the metal and walking on a snow covered rubber roof, 
[his] feet slipped out from underneath [him] and [he] landed on 
[his] backside and compressed [his] spine in [his] lower back." He 
claims that he was unable to get up for approximately one hour, and 
that he sustained "severe injury to lower back." He alleges that 
the injury caused him to be unable to work from January 15, 1993 to 
January 18, 1993. 
With regard to the above three cases, he claims he was earning 
$9 per hour and was working 50 hours per week. The employer claims 
that the wage rate was $7 per hour and the number of hours was 40 
per week in Case Number 94902. The evidence reasonably shows to a 
preponderance that the applicant was earning $8 per hour and was 
working 45 hours per week. His effective weekly rate of pay was 
$380. 
The last case, Case Number 94905, alleges that Mr. Day was 
working for Sheet Metal Systems. He claims this injury occurred on 
December 7, 1993 while working on a residential building in Hobble 
Creek Canyon. He states that "[he] hopped off the roof four feet in 
height. Upon impact, [he] experienced excruciating pain in [his] 
lower back that did not subside for three days." He states that he 
was off work from February 23, 1994 to present because of severe 
lower back pain. Application for Hearing (8/25/95). He claimed 
that he was earning $10.50 per hour, but gave no hours per week. 
Mr. Day requests medical expenses, recommended medical care, 
temporary total compensation (TTC), temporary partial compensation 
(TPC), permanent partial compensation (PPC), travel expenses, and 
interest. 
It was apparent at the hearing that there were inconsistencies 
between matters alleged in the applications for hearing and the 
testimony of the applicant. A Motion for Review was filed. The 
Commissioners reviewed the Motion for Review, and the following 
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facts were found by a preponderance: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: j 
1. The Industrial Commission of Utah (Commission) accepted Mr. 
Day's version of the events surrounding his accident and found that 
Mr. Day was in an industrial accident on March 18, 1992 while 
lifting roofing material with a coworker. The Commission has 
further found that although the employer disputes Mr. Day's account, 
the record shows that Mr. Day immediately reported his injury and 
was directed by his supervisor to obtain medical attention. The 
Commission has also found the medical records support Mr. Day,s 
rendition of events. 
2. Mr. Day alleges an additional injury to his low back on 
March 23, 1992 (Case Number 94903) when he lifted a piece of sheet 
metal weighing approximately two pounds while working for Utah Tile 
& Roofing. This injury was related to the ligamentous strain which 
he developed on or about March 18, 1992. Mr. Day did not lose any 
work as a result of this injury. He told Mr. Hill about this injury 
at the time. He was told to go to the doctor. 
3. On March 23, 1992, Mr. Day had a stiff back, but had no 
neurologic symptoms. Examination showed that he had full forward 
flexion, good left and right side bending as well as rotational 
motion. Mr. Day had mechanical back pain which was resolving, and 
he was returned to work on this day. He was given some stretching 
exercises. The medical records indicate that the applicant was 
injured on this day as a result of lifting sheet metal. MR 3. 
4. During the summer of 1992, Mr. Day was able to climb up a 
large vertical wall Batman style using only a rope. He also crawled 
out the passenger cab window of a moving pickup truck (50 MPH), and 
climbed into the bed of the same moving truck to the amazement of 
Mr. Day,s supervisor, the truck's owner. Testimony of Mr. Nelson. 
Mr. Nelson also testified that during the time he worked with Mr. 
Day, he never heard Mr. Day complain of pain. 
5. On.January 13, 1993, Mr. Day was working for Utah Tile. He 
was carrying a load of sheet metal, slipped, fell on his rear and 
his back. He claims that he lay on his back for about an hour 
because of the pain. Testimony of Mr. Day. He went to the hospital 
where he was diagnosed as having back strain. The medical films 
showed that his spine, including the vertebral heights and disc 
spaces were normal. LDS Hospital, Radiology Report of Dr. Mann 
(1/14/93). He told his supervisor Mr. Hill of his problem at the 
time. After examination, Mr. Day was released from the physician's 
care to regular duty on January 18, 1993. Medical Treatment Report 
(1/18/93). The medical report from WorkMed of January 18, 1993, 
indicates that Mr. Day was 100 percent improved. MR C55. The 
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applicant did not receive medical attention again until September 
30, 1993, MR A3. 
6. On October 27, 1993, Mr. Day reported that the pain in his 
back was a level five out of ten with ten being the worse. He noted 
the pain to be in the lumbar spine, and to be of the aching and 
stabbing type. He complained of back pain for one year and seven 
months. Significantly, he noted no pain or aching in his legs. MR 
13. The physician who examined Mr. Day, John Schlegel, M.D., noted 
that Mr. Day's signs and symptoms were consistent with a discogenic 
pain pattern and recommended an MRI scan. MR 14. That MRI scan was 
scheduled for December 7, 1993, but could not be performed because 
the machine would not work. MR 55-56. 
7. On December 7, 1993, Mr. Day used his hands to assist him 
in getting off of a four feet high wall while working for Sheet 
Metal Systems. He squatted down, placed the palms of his hands on 
either side of his feet, and used his hands and arms to lower his 
body straight down to the ground which was soft because it had been 
plowed. He claims that this injured his back. The evidence shows 
that the effective height from which he jumped was about one and 
one-half feet. The applicant argued that this was a jump from four 
feet. The evidence shows that it was clearly not a clean jump from 
four feet, and that Mr. Day used his hands and arms to assist him to 
lower himself to the ground from the four foot height. 
8. Mr. Day is a trained Army parachutist who knows how to do a 
parachute landing fall, and knows how to jump from aircraft in 
flight without injuring himself. Testimony of Mr. Day. Mr. Day 
admits that he did a good landing fall in the very short drop from 
the wall. Such a fall requires that the jumper land on the balls of 
the feet, that both feet are together, and that the knees are bent 
in order to cushion the impact. He indicated that he used such a 
technique in this "fall." Notwithstanding this, Mr. Day told Dr. 
Schlegel that he had fallen four feet on December 7, 1993. MR 8. 
9. Dr. Schlegel candidly admits that the etiology of the disc 
herniation is "not a clear or clean situation.11 MR 20. Although 
Dr. Schlegel feels that some injury caused the herniation, he 
reports that "accurate delineation of the [etiology] is essentially 
impossible...." 
10. An MRI scan read on December 13, 1993 determined that Mr. 
Day has a disc herniation at L5-S1, and required surgery to assist 
with pain control. MR 29, 31, 78. 
11. Dr. Terry Sawchuk examined the applicant and confirmed 
that the applicant should undergo surgery. The applicant was 
scheduled to have surgery on February 25, 1994. 
00568 
KEVIN T. DAY 
ORDER 
PAGE FIVE 
12. Mr. Day was released by Dr. Schlegel, orthopedic surgeon, 
to return to light duty work on August 3, 1994 using a lumbosacral 
corset with no "significant heavy lifting, bending, twisting or 
stooping." MR 26. 
13. It is found that the wage rate of Mr. Day was $9 per hour 
for 50 hours per week in Case Numbers 94902, 94903, 94904. In Case 
Number 94905, he was earning $10.50 per hour for 40 hours per week. 
14. This case was remanded by the Industrial Commission of 
Utah on February 5, 1996 with revised findings of fact and with 
instructions to send the case to a medical panel. Preliminary 
findings and proposed medical panel questions were sent to the 
parties on February 6, 1996 with instructions to the parties to 
reply with recommendations not later than the close of business on 
February 21, 1996. An extension of time until February 27, 1996 to 
file comments was requested by Utah Tile & Roofing, and was granted. 
15. Comments were received from all of the parties including 
the applicant himself. The case was sent to the medical panel on 
March 4, 1996. The medical panel met on March 20, 1996, and the 
medical panel report (MPR) was filed with the Industrial Commission 
of Utah (Commission) on April 15, 1996. 
16. The medical panel consisted of a neurologist as chair, and 
an orthopedic specialist as member. The panel used the AMA Guides 
to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Fourth Edition as 
modified (Guides). The panel reached the following conclusions to a 
reasonable medical probability: 
a. Of the four industrial accidents reported on March 18, 
1992; March 23, 1992; January 13, 1993, and December 7, 1993, the 
applicant had appropriate treatment for each of these for various 
intervals of time, and also with variable effect on his present 
condition. His initial injury on March 18, 1992 began the sequence 
of problems from which he continues to have difficulties. The 
second injury simply aggravated the underlying difficulty 
temporarily, and shortly thereafter, he returned to essentially the 
same status he was in before the second injury. The third injury 
again aggravated the underlying problem temporarily, and he returned 
to essentially the same status he was before the third injury 
occurred. 
b. The applicant reached medical stability in 
approximately mid-January 1993 and again on August 3, 1994 when 
released for light duty. If he were to undergo surgical interven-
tion for his residual difficulties, he would be expected to take 
four to six months to regain stability subsequent to that interven-
tion. 
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c. The applicant has been temporarily and totally 
disabled (TTD) since March 18, 1992 on the following dates: 
1. Five days related to March 18, 1992; 
2. No days related to March 23, 1992; 
3. Three days related to March 18, 1992 and January 
13, 1993 (1.5 days to each period). 
4. TTD since December 7, 1993 to August 3, 1994 when 
he was returned for light duty. (1/3 of the time off related to 
March 18, 1993; January 13, 1993, and December 7, 1993). 
d. The applicant has a permanent partial impairment of 
the whole person of five percent of which 1/3 is related to each of 
the following incidents: March 18, 1992; January 13, 1993, and 
December 7, 1993. He has no preexisting and/or subsequent 
impairments. 
e. His medical problems were related to the industrial 
accidents and the medical and therapy treatment was appropriate for 
those injuries. 
f. Future medical treatment will include infrequent 
orthopedic follow-up for counsel with reference to use of 
appropriate medications, counsel with reference to appropriate 
activities and work, and counsel with reference to self-activated 
exercise programs. In the event of persisting symptoms, it would be 
reasonable for the applicant to undergo surgical correction, and 
unless there is some significant supervening event, this would be 
attributed to the past injuries, as noted. 
16. On April 16, 1996, the MPR was sent to the parties with 
instructions to reply with objections within 15 days of the letter 
(May 1, 1996). MPR objections were received from the applicant on 
April 30, 1996 and from Utah Tile & Roofing on May 2, 1996. The 
case was sent back to the medical panel for clarification on July 3, 
1996 based on the objections. 
17. The applicant objected based upon his contention that the 
medical panel should have stated that, relating to TTD for December 
7, 1993, the applicant returned to work on January 20, 1995 out of 
necessity rather than on January 20, 1994. 
18. Utah Tile & Roofing objections related to clarifying the 
date of onset of the first L5-S1 abnormality and the delineation 
between the L2-3 and L5-S1 injuries. 
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19. The case was sent back to the medical panel on July 2, 
1996 for clarification. The medical panel met again and consisted 
of the same member and chair as originally constituted. The 
clarifications were received by the Commission from the medical 
panel on October 2, 1996. The clarifications were sent to the 
parties on October 3, 1996. A request was received from Sheet Metal 
Systems on October 30, 1996 reiterating some findings from the 
original order, making argument, and asking that it be dismissed 
from the case. The applicant filed a response on October 14, 1994 
noting that the reference in letters and medical panel reports to a 
May 18, 1992 injury was likely a clerical error or oversight and 
should have been March 18, 1992. 
20. It is found that reference to May 18, 1992 is in error and 
the correct date is March 18, 1992. 
21. The panel noted that the correct date as noted above in 
paragraph 17 of this order was January 20, 1995. Further, the panel 
noted that the facet change was probably a result of the first March 
1992 event with some degree of improvement subsequently. It is 
impossible to know when the L5-S1 disc herniation began. 
22. The back rating is based on the low back problem in its 
totality without consideration as to whether one or more levels may 
be involved. The panel did not find good evidence for a 
radiculopathy at the time of the examination though it may well have 
been present when others examined him. 
23. The panel noted that the doctors who examined the 
applicant at the time of the March 1992 and January 1993 injuries 
noted tenderness at L2-3, but their observed findings after the 
December 1993 incident suggested a disc with radiculopathy. Without 
an MRI, however, it is impossible to determine specifically the date 
of onset of the first L5-S1 abnormality. Adding the phrase "with 
history of L2-3 symptoms" does not significantly change the percent 
whole person impairment, based on the panel's interpretation of the 
AMA Guides. 
24. The medical panel report is adopted with modifications as 
noted previously. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. With regard to the December 7, 1993 event, it is found that 
the effective jump was from 1 and 1/2 feet and does not meet the 
Allen test of an unusual or extraordinary effort. Allen v. Ind. 
Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). The evidence shows that the 
applicant had preexisting problems stemming from the work done for 
Utah Tile & Roofing. The applicant's problems on December 7, 1993 
thus resulted from the three prior work injuries and aggravations. 
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2. Mr. Day's low back problems arose out of and in the course 
of his employment on March 18, 1992 and January 13, 1993 for Utah 
Tile & Roofing, The event of December 13, 1993 is also attributed 
to Utah Tile & Roofing since it arose during usual effort and the 
implication of the medical panel report is that the December 13, 
1993 occurrence likely would not have happened had his back not been 
weakened during the previous March 18, 1992 and January 13, 1993 
episodes, U.C.A. Section 35-1-45. 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that that the claims against Sheet Metal 
Sytems, Inc. and Transamerica Insurance filed by Kevin T. Day be 
dismissed with prejudice since the injuries incurred on December 7, 
1993 resulted from preexisting injuries while the applicant was an 
employee of Utah Tile and Roofing. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Utah Tile and Roofing and/or CNA 
Insurance pay to Kevin T. Day temporary total disability compensa-
tion for seven days related to the event of March 18, 1992; two days 
related to the event of January 13, 1993, and 34.143 weeks related 
to the December 7, 1993 through August 2, 1994 period. The total 
number of weeks and days for which Mr. Day shall be paid equals 
35.429 weeks. He shall be paid at a rate of $253 per week. To this 
amount shall be added $20 for his dependents totaling a weekly rate 
of $273. He shall be paid $9,672.12 for the stated periods less any 
amount already paid for these periods. He shall be paid interest at 
the rate of eight percent per annum from August 3, 1994 when he 
reached medical stability. The* total amount of principal and 
interest is accrued and shall be paid in a lump sum subject to 
amounts to be paid to his attorney. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Utah Tile & Roofing and/or CNA 
Insurance pay to Kevin T. Day permanent partial impairment for his 
low back injuries of five perc€*nt of the whole person at a weekly 
rate of $273 per week for 15.6 weeks for a total of $4,258.80 
beginning on August 3, 1994. This amount is accrued and shall be 
paid in a lump sum at eight percent interest per annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Utah Tile and Roofing and/or CNA 
Insurance pay the medical expenses including mileage related to 
Kevin T. Day's medical treatments for his low back injuries on March 
18, 1992, March 23, 1992, January 13, 1993, and December 7, 1993 in 
accordance with the Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah. The medical providers shall be paid 
interest at eight percent per annum from the date when they first 
billed for their services. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Utah Tile & Roofing and/or CNA 
Insurance pay to Preston L. Handy, attorney for Kevin T. Day, an 
attorney's fee of 20 percent of the first $15,000, and 15 percent of 
the next $15,000, paid to Mr. Day in accordance with R568-1-7D (Utah 
Admin. Code). The computation of the attorney/s fee shall be based 
upon the compensation, the interest, and the mileage. The 
attorney's fee shall be paid directly to Mr. Handy and shall be 
deducted from the amount to be paid to Mr. Day. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be received in the offices of the Commission within 
thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying in detail the 
particular errors and objections, and, unless received by the 
Commission within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, this Order 
shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. If a Motion for 
Review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, any response by the opposing party shall be filed 
within 15 days of the date of receipt of the Motion for Review by 
the Commission in accordance with U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12. 
JI DATED THIS / Q day o f November 1 9 9 6 . 
INJS^TRIAL COMMISSIONS OF UTAH 
in A. Sims 
strative Law Judge 
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Utah Tile & Roofing and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, CNA Insurance 
Company (referred to jointly as "Utah Tile" hereafter) ask The Industrial Commission of Utah to 
review the Administrative Law Judge's determination that Utah Tile is liable for benefits awarded 
to Kevin T. Day under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. The Industrial Commission exercises 
jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-82.53 and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did Mr. Day's accident on December 7, 1993, while employed by Sheet Metal Systems, 
result from an "unusual or extraordinary exertion" so as to constitute the legal cause for Mr. Day's 
subsequent injuries. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Industrial Commission adopts the ALJ's findings of fact. In summary, prior to 
December 7, 1993, Mr. Day suffered from a preexisting back condition due to three earlier accidents 
at Utah Tile. On December 7, 1993, Mr. Day was employed by Sheet Metal Systems, working on 
top of a wall four feet high. In dismounting, he squatted on the top of the wall, placed his hands on 
either side of his feet, and used his hands and arms to lower his body to the grounds. On dropping 
the remaining 18 inches to the ground, he suffered further aggravation of his back condition. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
As noted above, Mr. Day has suffered four work related accidents and injuries. The first 
three accidents occurred in the course of his employment by Utah Tile. The fourth accident occurred 
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In determining the respective liability of Utah Tile and Sheet Metal Systems for Mr. Day's 
workers' compensation benefits, the ALJ concluded that at the time Mr. Day worked for Sheet Metal 
Systems he already suffered a preexisting back condition from his earlier accidents at Utah Tile. 
Consequently, Sheet Metal Systems was liable for a share of Mr. Day's benefits only if his accident 
at Sheet Metal Systems was the result of an "extraordinary or unusual exertion", thereby meeting 
the test for legal causation established in Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 
If the accident at Sheet Metal Systems was not the result of an extraordinary or unusual exertion, 
then Mr. Day's injuries would be considered aggravations of the injuries he had suffered in his 
earlier accidents at Utah Tile. As such, it would be Utah Tile's responsibility to pay all Mr. Day's 
benefits. 
The Industrial Commission agrees with the ALJ's finding that Mr. Day's activity at Sheet 
Metal Systems were not an extraordinary or unusual exertion. A drop of about 18 inches is 
equivalent to stepping off a platform or footstool, or sliding from the bed of a pickup truck to the 
pavement. Because Mr. Day's accident at Sheet Metal Systems was not the result of an 
extraordinary or unusual exertion, Utah Tile remains liable for Mr. Day's workers' compensation 
benefits. 
ORDER 
The Industrial Commission affirms the decision of the ALJ and denies Utah Tile's motion 
for review. It is so ordered. 
IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE. 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request 
for reconsideration must be received by the Industrial Commission within 20 days of the date of this 
order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a 
petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 
30 days of the date of this order. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of 
Kevin T. DAY, Case No. 94-0902 was mailed first class postage prepaid this /sg/iday of May 
1997, to the following: 
KEVIN T. DAY 
5965 SOUTH 5625 WEST 
KEARNS, UTAH 84118 
THEODORE KANELL 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
4 TRIAD CENTER #500 
P O BOX 2970 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84180 
STEVEN AESCHBACHER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
79 SOUTH MAIN STREET #400 
P O BOX 45385 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-0385 
PRESTON HANDY, 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
5684 SOUTH GREEN STREET 
MURRAY, UTAH 84123 
UTAH TILE & ROOFING 
555 WEST 3900 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107 
CNA INSURANCE COMPANY 
CCU UNIT 
PO BOX 17930 
DENVER, COLORADO 80217-0930 
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A. He was referred to me by my brother-in-law, 
Bill, who had also had a back injury. He said he was the 
best I could get for myself. I hadn't had help up to now, 
to go see him because he was a good, honest doctor. He 
could help me. 
Q. So you saw Dr. Slagle in October of '93. 
What did you tell Dr. Slagle? 
A. I told Dr. Slagle that I was angry, that I 
had a serious problem with my back and a lot of anger 
towards the doctors who hadn't helped me in the past, that 
they hadn't given me proper medical attention I deserved, 
and that he was my last hope to finally help me, just to 
help me. That's all I asked him for. 
Q. Do you remember what his examination 
involved? 
A. Well, his first examination was the MRI. He 
said that would tell all. He said if there's a problem, 
the MRI will pick it up. 
Q. Do you remember when he scheduled the MRI? 
A. He scheduled it for the 13th of December. 
Q. In December of 1993, who were you working 
for? 
A. In December? I was working for Sheet Metal 
Systems by then. 
Q. What were you doing for them? What was your 











Same, tinner, sheet metal mechanic. 
Do you remember how many hours a week you 
40 to 50. 
Do you remember your wage? 
10.50. 
On December 7th, 1993, were you working for 










I hopped off 
excruciating 
Yes. 
Where were you working? 
Hobble Creek canyon, Springville canyon. 
Did you have an incident of injury on this 
Yes. 
Tell me about it. 
Well, I exited off of the garage roof 
four feet in height. I had tennis shoes on. 
and landed on both feet but experienced 
pain. I didn't go to the doctor for three 
days after that because every day gradually I got stiffer 
and the pain — trying to move the stiff body just got 
worse and worse. 
Q. 
off this roof 
Right after this incident where you hopped 
, what did you do? 































What did you do right after you hopped off 
the roof, landed on your feet and felt the pain? 
A. Well, I sat there for a few minutes and then 

















Rick and Mick Stead. 
Other than these two, who did you tell about 
? 
Well, I told the Chesters, or the owners of 
in the office. I told them that night when we 
What did they tell you to do? 
To go to the doctor and get it checked out. 
Did you go to a doctor after? 
Yes. I went and saw Dr. Lynn, who was the 





JUDGE SIMS: What was his name? 
THE WITNESS: Dr. Lynn, Brian Lynn. 
BY MR. HANDY: And this was before you had 
Yes. 
What did Dr. Lynn — do you remember what i 
SHARON ROMNEY, CSR; ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING, (801) 531-0256 
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1 fixed and we'll take your picture, and I did. Something 
2 like that, that I remember. 
3 Q. Okay. And then they cross out that date and 
4 change it to the 13th when you actually finally went in for 
5 the test? 
6 A. Right, 
7 Q. And in the meantime you had this incident 
8 that you reported to Dr. Lynn on December 10th, 1993; is 
9 that right? 
10 A. Right. 
11 Q. He says, "The patient comes in today three 
12 days following a fall from approximately four feet onto 
13 both feet, at which time he experienced excruciating back 
14 pain." 
15 Do you know why he called it a fall? 
16 A. No, sir. 
17 Q. We took your deposition. Do you remember 
18 telling me that you jumped from about this level? 
19 A. Chest height, four feet, I said. 
20 Q. Why don't you stand up and let the judge see 
21 how high that is. 
2 2 A. I think that's right around four feet. 
23 JUDGE SIMS: Do you want to describe the 
24 height for the record since — 
25 THE WITNESS: I say that because standing 
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1 next to this wall, when you get right next to it, crawl up 
2 there or whatever, this is where the roof hit me, right 
3 about here. Because you had enough room to put your hands 
4 up there and — 
5 JUDGE SIMS: How many feet is that? 
6 MR. KANELL: I think it's about four feet. 
7 JUDGE SIMS: Okay. 
8 Q. BY MR. KANELL: Now, would you say that 
9 jumping off a four-foot wall is something that your wife 
10 would do on an everyday basis? 
11 A. I don't know why. 
12 Q. She wouldn't, would she? 
13 A. Well, maybe she would. 
14 Q. That's not something that she would normally 
15 be called to do, though, is it, in everyday life? 
16 A. Well, no.. 
17 Q. Now, this doctor says on this date on 
18 December the 10th, 1993, which is page 8 of the record, he 
19 says, "At this time," he says, "you experienced 
20 excruciating pain," which you identified. Then he says, 
21 "The pain has not subsided over the last two days and the 
22 patient presents now for evaluation denying numbness or 
23 bowel or bladder dysfunctions and a feeling of weakness in 
24 his legs, only when the pain is at its worst." 
25 So now you did have pain going down your 




A. No. In my opinion, I guess the pain from 
inflaming it to that point overrode the sensations of 
numbness and whatnot for that period of time. That's the 
best I can tell you. 
MR. KANELL: May I approach the witness, 
Your Honor? 
THE WITNESS: Once again, when I went to the 
doctor, I told him the most serious symptoms I had. I 
wasn't feeling numbness anymore, I was feeling pain. Had I 
been feeling both, I would have told him I was feeling 
both. 
Q. BY MR. KANELL: Okay. And on December 16th, 
you filled out a sheet which is found on page 9 of the 
record and you put some little marks which appear to be 
identified as a stabbing — 
A. Stabbing. 
Q. And you got that going down your right leg; 
is that right? 
A. Right. 
Q. Almost to your knee; is that right? 
A. Right, right in here, this area* 
Q. And you remember filling out one of those on 
October 27th when you saw Dr. Slagle? 
A. I don't remember filling one out on that 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Okay. And coming on further down the page 
3 you state that you've had the pain for one year and seven 
4 months; is that correct? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. And you said you had weakness in your legs 
7 or arms; is that correct? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Mr. Day, let's talk about the accident of 
10 December 7th of 1993 while you were working for my client, 
11 which is Sheet Metal Systems. 
12 A. Okay. 
13 Q. The employer's E-l, which you probably 
14 haven't seen, it's the employer's first report of injury, 
15 indicates that, in your words — this is what you told 
16 them — that you were (inaudible) off this room and you 
17 jumped about four feet and landed on some soft dirt." Is 
18 that what you told them? 
19 A. That's right. 
2 0 Q. And that's what happened? 
21 J A. That's what happened. 
22 | Q. Let's talk about how you actually jumped 
23 I down off of this. I am going to risk my own workers' comp 
24 | injury right now because I am going to stand up on this 
25 | thing. 









and clean it, 
Q. 
May I, Your Honor? 
I bent down at the knees and put one hand on 
hopped up. 
There's a point I want to make, though. 
JUDGE SIMS: Go ahead. 
BY MR. STURDY: So you are on this roof; is 
JUDGE SIMS: We'll bill you if there are any 
MR. STURDY: I'll come back with my Windex 
Your Honor. 
And so one of the theories, I suppose, is 
that you just jumped down from this height, four feet up, 




You squatted down on your hands and then 









Exactly. How did you know that? 
I asked you in your deposition. 
Okay. 
How long are your legs? 
My legs are probably not more than 50 
No, your inseam. 
Oh, my inseam? 
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Q. Your wife may know. 
A. 3 2 inches, 
Q. All right* So you have 32-inch inseam. So 
when you are at this point on your hands and jumped down, 
your legs pretty much covered the distance for you, didn't 
they? 
A. Just about. 
Q. So you've got about a four-foot height. 
That's 48 inches, 32-inch inseam, and you dropped actually 
about 16 inches; is that right? 
A. That sounds right. 
Q. Okay. Check my math. 
JUDGE SIMS: Are you going to use the 
airborne (inaudible) — 
MR. STURDY: Your Honor, I would hurt myself 





Were you airborne qualified? 
Yes, I was. 
So you know what we are talking 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
Q. BY MR. STURDY: Mr. Day, I am not sure it's 
come out exactly what was happening with the first injury, 
and I have seen it enough times in the medical records that 
it's starting to blur for me. Let's talk about that for a 






























That sounds right. 
Did you leave work then in anticipation of 






Yes, I did. 
You mentioned a motorcycle accident in the 
Did you hurt your back? 
No, sir. 
I missed the date on the Tribune article. I 




Yes, I think that was. 
Is that about when the incident occurred 
that the article described? 
A. 
Q. 











When we talk about a parachute landing 
you had training in how to jump? 
Yes, I have. 
And you jumped onto plowed ground? 
It was not plowed, it was fresh. 
In other words, they churned up the ground? 
you are saying? 
Actually, it was freshly thrown, fill sand. 
It wasnft that hard, huh? 
No. 
And you squatted down, as I understand — 











— before you hit the ground? So you know 

















Yes, I do, exactly. 
Did you have training in the service — 
Yes, I did. 
— on parachute landing falls and how to 
Yes. 
A great deal of training? 
Yes, sir. 
And you have made parachute jumps from — 
36 — 
— aircraft in flight? 
3 6 jumps,. 
You had equipment, most likely, you were 
60 pounds. 
— when you jumped? 
Yes, sir. 
MR. STURDY: Any questions based on what I 
have asked him? 
he was coming 
MR. HANDY: Only that the 60 pounds is when 
out of an airplane, Your Honor. 
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1 MR. STURDY: Yeah. 
2 MR. HANDY: You didn't have any rolls of 
3 (inaudible) that you jumped with? 
4 A. Just standard equipment. 
5 MR. HANDY: Any questions on what I have 
6 asked? 
7 MR. KANELL: I111 follow up. 
8 
9 FURTHER EXAMINATION 
10 BY MR. KANELL: 
11 Q. You did testify that immediately after that 
12 jump you felt, I think your words were, excruciating pain; 
13 is that right? You111 have to answer audibly• 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. And didn't you tell the doctor, Dr. Lynn, 
16 three days later that the pain had got worse? 
17 A. Worse, yes. 
18 Q. For the next three days? 
19 A. Over the course of the next three days, yes, 
20 gradually getting worse. 
21 Q. Okay. 
22 A. (Inaudible) from excruciating to just 
2 3 totally unbearable. That's how I ended up in the 
24 hospital. I was working with excruciating. Three days 
25 later when it becomes unbearable, I am in the hospital 
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1 saying help me. 
2 MR. KANELL: I have nothing further, Your 
3 Honor. 
4 JUDGE SIMS: Okay. Thank you all very 
5 much. Thank you very much, sir. 
6 Do you have any further witnesses? 
7 MR. HANDY: I don't, Your Honor. 
8 JUDGE SIMS: Okay. Do you have four 
9 witnesses? 
10 MR. KANELL: I have, Your Honor. Can we 
11 just take about a 10-minute break? 
12 JUDGE SIMS: Okay. And how many witnesses 
13 are you going to have? 
14 MR. STURDY: We have no witnesses. 
15 JUDGE SIMS: We111 go ahead and take a brief 
16 recess here. 
17 (Whereupon a recess was taken.) 
18 JUDGE SIMS: We are back on the record. 
19 All parties who were here at the time of recess are again 
20 present. 
21 You are have rested at this point; is that 
22 correct? 
23 MR. HANDY: Yes, Your Honor. 
24 JUDGE SIMS: Mr. Kanell? 
25 MR. KANELL: Your Honor, we call Paul Seppi 
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